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THE SELF-STYLING OF RELEVANCE THEORY 
 
This book deals with an important problem area of psycholinguistics and, 
generally, the study of language and cognition: its central theme is the gap 
that exists between linguistically provided information and fully integrated 
comprehension. The problem of filling that gap has proved immense, and so 
far the sciences that try to contribute to an understanding of the processes 
involved have not been able to do more than nibble at the edges.  
    In general terms, the problem amounts to something like the following. As 
has often been observed, for an utterance to make sense in a communicative 
situation it must ‘have a point’: it must contribute something new to some 
concern of the moment. The strict linguistic meaning of the utterance is very 
frequently insufficient to achieve the goal of fully integrated comprehension: 
one can ‘understand’ an utterance and yet fail to see its point. In such a case 
one is entitled to say ‘I don't see what you mean’. One might say that for an 
utterance to ‘have a point’, to link up with some concern of the moment, is 
for that utterance to be relevant. Only if the relevance of an utterance is 
grasped is there full comprehension. Schematically speaking one can say that 
there is a relevance function R which takes as input pairs <u,C> of utterances 
and ‘concerns’, and yields as output integrated interpretations. The empirical 
and theoretical problem is then to make R explicit, i.e., to provide an analysis 
of what is involved in the ‘linking up’ of an utterance u to some concern C, 
and to specify what ‘fully integrated comprehension’ amounts to, or, in other 
words, what is meant by ‘the point’ of an utterance. We can now say that an 
utterance u is relevant with respect to a concern C just in case there is a value 
for <u,C> in R.  
    There is, furthermore, an expectation on the part of any hearer that an 
utterance will be relevant, — there is a ‘presumption of good sense’. If an 
utterance fails to be relevant in a given C, then a hearer will start a search for 
some other C in which the utterance is relevant. Full comprehension is, 
therefore, conditional on the selection of a suitable C, which must also be 
identical with the C in which the speaker planned his utterance. The major 
questions in this whole complex are: ‘What makes an utterance relevant in a 
given C?’, and: ‘What makes a hearer decide whether a given C is the one 
intended by the speaker?’. These questions have so far remained without an  
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answer, and Sperber and Wilson (henceforth SW) are to be commended for 
focussing the attention on them.  
    Beyond that, unfortunately, there is little SW are to be commended for. In 
spite of the rather grandiose claims (‘a new approach to the study of human 
communication’ (p.vii), ‘the foundation for a unified theory of cognitive 
science’(cover blurb)), and despite the appearance of formal rigour, a closer 
inspection soon reveals that no foundations are laid at all for cognitive 
science, that the definitions are almost always imprecise and sometimes 
circular, that the procedures proposed or suggested are incoherent or unclear. 
In short, there is a great deal of quasi-formal window dressing; at crucial 
points in what should be the formal analysis SW fall back on a level of 
phenomenological impressionism. No model gets off the ground at all.  
    It would be easy, and not totally unjustified, to be summarily dismissive 
about this book. Yet I will discuss it in detail, mainly to warn against a 
creeping tendency, manifest in pragmatic writings these days, not to apply 
normal standards of precision and scholarship but make do with quasi-
theories and quasi-solutions. This book has inherited much of that practice.  
    An additional factor is the history of the book. It was preceded by a paper, 
of the same authors, in Smith (1982), as well as by numerous presentations at 
conferences. Observations regarding the insufficient formal backing of the 
proposals made were invariably countered with references to the present 
book, where the necessary formal analyses would be made available (cp. SW 
1982:72: ‘In Sperber and Wilson (forthcoming) we provide a characterization 
of such a model. Here we shall assume the problem solved’). Now, however, 
we see that the book contains hardly more (attempts at) formalism than SW 
(1982), and the practice of showing by example what should be shown by 
analysis and theory is simply continued, but on a larger scale. The pertinent 
criticisms voiced in Smith (1982) by Gazdar & Good, Moore, Wilks and 
Clark do not seem to have been either heeded or countered.  
    Although the book claims to lay the foundation for a unified theory of 
cognitive science, it does not present itself in the context of existing cognitive 
science but as a revision of Gricean pragmatics. The relevant psycholinguis-
tic literature on inferencing, frame constraints, prototypes, etc., as factors in 
securing relevance for communicative utterances, is poorly represented. 
Although a fair number of publications from this area are mentioned in the 
bibliography, only passing reference is made to them in the actual text, and 
many important titles are missing altogether. Grice, on the other hand, looms 
large in the text. The book clearly continues the lines set out by Grice. In fact, 
the authors claim that all Grice’s conversational maxims can be replaced by 
the single maxim ‘be relevant’ A Gricean perspective, properly developed, 
could be very useful in cognitive science, where experimenters all too often 
suffer from theoretical myopia. This book, however, offers nothing remotely 
like a properly developed Gricean perspective, and it is more likely to con-
fuse experimenters than to enlighten them.  
    There is no systematic survey in the book of the known means by which  
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relevance is achieved, i.e., by which listeners select appropriate ‘concerns’ 
and speakers enable listeners to do so. Despite the large number of examples 
discussed, the array of possible devices remains limited. In principle, no other 
relevance-boosting devices are dealt with than frame-based inferences and 
pure inferencing, with some literary devices lumped together under the name 
'metaphor' and loosely mentioned in the last chapter. Yet it is known that 
more relevance-boosting devices are used in communication than just these.  
    A particularly deplorable gap in this respect is the total neglect of the role 
of presuppositions. There is a certain body of perfectly accessible literature 
where presuppositions are presented as systematic properties of sentences. A 
presupposition ensures that information necessary for the interpretation of its 
carrier sentence is stored in the mental representation of the discourse 
preceding the utterance of the carrier sentence (e.g. Isard 1975, Karttunen 
1974, Stalnaker 1978, McCawley 1979, Reichgelt 1982, Shadbolt 1983, 
Seuren 1985, Fauconnier 1985). Sometimes the presupposition will already 
be represented in the discourse representation because it has been uttered as a 
separate utterance. But, perhaps more often, it will be supplied post hoc, on 
account of it being a systematic sentence property (so that competent speak-
ers of the language ‘know’ what to supply). This process is variously called 
‘accommodation’ or ‘backward suppletion’. Take, for example, the following 
exchange:  
(1)  A: Why does Harry get so inflamed when he sees the pope on TV? 
  B: He has renounced Catholicism.  
B’s reply entails presuppositionally that Harry had been a catholic before. 
This entailment is singled out by the listener (though the heuristics of this 
process is not systematically understood), and immediately supplied post hoc 
in the discourse representation (if it wasn't represented there already). Now 
the discourse representation will contain more than just the representations of 
the two sentences given in (1), since it has the extra representation of ‘Harry 
was a catholic before’, which is a further, solid, element in the inferential 
process needed to make B’s reply relevant. There must be available, more-
over, background information that the pope is the head of the Catholic 
Church and some generalizations, e.g. that people who renounce a faith often 
turn into rabid enemies. SW may disagree with this discourse-connected 
notion of presupposition, but then, given their explicit concern with contex-
tual phenomena, their readers expect an argument explaining SW’s position. 
As it is, however, presuppositions are not mentioned at all in this context. 
Whatever little there is on presuppositions (pp.202–217) deals with ‘presup-
positional effects’ of emphatically or contrastively accented constituents of 
sentences (and that in SW's usual loose and inconsequential way).1  
    Backward suppletion is widely discussed in the psycholinguistic literature 
in connection with background knowledge (e.g. Haviland & Clark 1974, Clark 
& Haviland 1977, Sanford & Garrod 1981:129, Brown & Yule 1983:234–247). 
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Often just backward suppletion of a presupposition is not sufficient for full 
comprehension of the relevance of an utterance in a given context: further 
elements are needed, and these are often retrieved from what is known as 
‘background knowledge’. In (2a), for example, background knowledge will 
provide the implicit connection between the car and the driver. In (2b), 
however, no background knowledge can be presumed to provide a link 
between John and his ‘upper wheel’, or to specify what an ‘upper wheel’ could 
be, or what it could be to start it, or why lifting it would help, or even what 
had to be helped:  
(2)  a.  The car stopped. The driver got out. 
 b.  John came barging into the room. His upper wheel, however, wouldn't 
       start, and he was unable to lift it.  
In both cases an existential presupposition (‘there was a driver’, ‘there was an 
upper wheel’) is among those supplied post hoc, but only in (2a) does 
background knowledge complete the picture. Other types of presuppositions 
can do the same job, however. Thus, in (3) the presupposition associated with 
not … either provokes the presupposition that something else, besides the cup, 
didn't hold. From A’s question it can be inferred that the ‘something else’ was 
the vase. Some further (background) knowledge is, however, still required for 
a listener to comprehend what is going on: there must be a little history of 
putting or gluing together the vase and the cup in the same, deficient, manner:  
(3)  A: How come that vase broke? I only touched it lightly. 
  B: The cup didn't hold either. 
Another device to achieve relevance is the identification of discourse entities 
despite differing descriptions, a stylistic device often used by journalists:  
(4)  Yesterday a Swiss banker was arrested at Heathrow Airport. The 
  53-year old bachelor declared that he had come to Britain to kidnap 
  the Queen.  
Then, the selection of the correct reading, in a context, of a polysemous item 
seems guided by considerations of relevance. This applies not only to the 
‘classical’ cases of polysemy, such as (5a,b), but also to more far-fetched cases 
such as (5c,d) (discussed, e.g., in Brown & Yule 1983:210–214):  
(5) a.   The school is away on an outing today. (i.e. the people involved) 
 b.   Look, the school is on fire! (i.e., the building)  
 c.   Plato is on the bottom shelf. (i.e., the works by Plato)  
 d.   The ham sandwich has just left. (i.e., the person who ordered it)  
The list of relevance-boosting devices could easily be extended. The point is,  
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however, that it would have been useful if SW had done this in their book. As 
it is, they concentrate on frame-based and pure inferencing, in mutual inter-
action. A prime example is found on pp.121–122:  
(6) Flag-seller: Would you like to buy a flag for the Royal National  
   Lifeboat Institution?  
     Passer-by: No thanks, I always spend my holidays with my sister in  
   Birmingham.  
By itself, the reason given by the passer-by is hardly sufficient for his negative 
reply. However, conjoined with a few extra premises, like those in (7a-e), a 
conclusion can be reached that is a sufficient ground for the refusal. These 
extra premises, however, must be retrieved from background knowledge, or 
just invented in order to achieve a coherent pattern:  
(7)  a.   Birmingham is inland. 
 b.   The Royal National Lifeboat Institution is a charity. 
 c.    Buying a flag is one way of subscribing to a charity. 
 d.   Someone who spends his holidays inlands has no need of the  
        services of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. 
 e.   Someone who has no need of the services of a charity cannot be  
       expected to subscribe to that charity. 
ERGO: The passer-by cannot be expected to subscribe to the Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution.  
Nothing is said on the problems involved in the heuristics of such extra 
premises, or on the probability of the whole scenario (once an interlocutor is 
branded as ‘weird’, there is no limit to the possible hypotheses of what he 
thinks makes his utterances relevant).  
    Inadequate treatment of the literature and uneven handling of topics would 
be excusable if the book contained exciting new ideas opening new vistas. 
Unfortunately, however, this is not the case. Let us have a more detailed look 
at the text.  
    Chapter 1, ‘Communication’, sets the pragmatic stage. It is a lengthy 
exposé of the well-known fact that linguistic messages underdetermine full 
comprehension. This well-known fact is presented in the well-known format 
of top-down processes meeting bottom-up processes somewhere in the mid- 
dle, but it is not presented in this terminology (which, apparently, smacks too 
much of cognitive science and too little of pragmatics). SW have a ‘code 
model’ (bottom-up) and an ‘inferential model’ (top-down), and they set up 
strawmen who supposedly maintain that the one or the other model has 
exclusive rights. Unfortunately, some names of real men are attached to the 
straw figures (e.g. Grice is said to represent the inferential model), and these 
real men thus see their views distorted. The unsurprising conclusion is (p.27)  
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that ‘a coding-decoding process is subservient to a Gricean inferential 
process’.  
    It must be said in SW’s defence that, in reaching this conclusion, they stress 
certain features of communicative processes that are well worth stressing in 
the context of cognitive science, such as the unimportance of the ‘mutual 
knowledge paradox’ (pp.15–21), or the importance of the recognition of 
communicative intentions (p.25). Yet the overall result is poor. After a great 
deal of terminological prancing (about what is ‘manifest’, ‘known’, ‘assumed’, 
etc.), the chapter ends (p.63) with a heavy-footed definition of what the 
authors call ‘ostensive-inferential communication’:  
‘Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator produces a stimulus 
which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the 
communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions {I}.’  
(Note that ‘{I}’ does not stand for a set with the set I as its only member, but 
actually denotes the set containing the members of I. I shall not follow this 
unnecessarily confusing notation, and use ‘I’ to refer to SW’s ‘set of assump- 
tions’. Only in quotations will the SW-notation be maintained.)  
    The term ‘assumptions’ is briefly defined on p.2:  
 ‘By assumptions we mean thoughts treated by the individual as representations of 
the actual world (as opposed to fictions, desires, or representations of represen-
tations).’  
The use of this term in this chapter (pp.58–60), as well as its further discussion 
in chapter 2, reinforces the impression that 'assumption' stands roughly for 
what others call ‘proposition believed to be true’. This being so, one wonders 
whether ostensive-inferential communication excludes questions, com- 
mands, and other non-assertive speech acts. SW are not explicit on this. What 
transpires is that the linguistic element ‘coded communication’) only serves 
‘as a means of strengthening ostensive-inferential communication’. So let us 
sober up and simply say that ‘ostensive-inferential communication’ is com-
munication tout court, and ‘coded communication’ isn’t communication at all 
but only the linguistic element in it. Communication is a difficult enough 
notion as it is. We do not need to make it more difficult.  
   And this is precisely what SW do. Let us see what can be meant by the 
word ‘manifest’ occurring several times in the definition quoted. For this we 
must go back to p.39, where we read the following characterizations:  
(a)    ‘A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable 
at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as 
true or probably true.’  
(b)    ‘To be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable.’  
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We thus infer that ‘manifest’ is a predicate that applies to (probably) true 
facts which are within the mental reach, by perception or by inference, of the 
subject to whom they are manifest. It is thus a predicate that applies to what 
is in the world, not to what is in the processing mind. Then, surprisingly, we 
read:  
(c)   ‘We want to elaborate the notion of what is manifest in two ways: first, we 
want to extend it from facts to all assumptions; and second, we want to 
distinguish degrees of manifestness.’  
(d)   ‘An assumption, then, is manifest in a cognitive environment if the environ-
ment provides sufficient evidence for its adoption, and as we all know, mis-
taken assumptions are sometimes very well evidenced.’  
From this we gather that the predicate ‘manifest’ applies also to mental enti-
ties, such as assumptions (thoughts believed to be true). Manifest assump-
tions are now assumptions with sufficient grounding in available facts 
(manifest facts, presumably). That is, one cannot be held responsible if a 
manifest assumption turns out to be false. So why not say: ‘justified assump- 
tions’? One begins to wonder if the term ‘manifest’ is not made ambiguous 
by all this, since one can hardly say that justified thoughts are ‘perceptible or 
inferable’ (quote b), these being world predicates, and not mental predicates.  
    Our powers of comprehension are stretched even more on the next page 
(p. 40), where the following gem appears:  
(e)   ‘Our notion of what is manifest to an individual is clearly weaker than the notion 
of what is actually known or assumed. A fact can be manifest without being 
known: all the individual’s actual assumptions are manifest to him, but many 
more assumptions which he has not actually made are manifest to him too.’  
Remember that assumptions are ‘thoughts treated by the individual as repre- 
sentations of the actual world’, (p.2). So now we are saddled with thoughts 
that are manifest to an individual but do not actually occur, or assumptions 
that he has not actually made but are yet manifest to him. My most charitable 
interpretation is that what SW wish to regard as manifest assumptions are 
possible justified assumptions as well as justified assumptions actually made.  
    Let us now revert to the definition quoted from p.63. One is struck first by 
the condition that the communicator must, by producing a stimulus, make it 
‘mutually manifest’ to himself and the audience that he intends to make 
(more) manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I. According to pp.41–
42 this means that the speaker must make it clear to his audience that he 
originated ‘the stimulus’. One wonders if this entails that an utterance whose 
utterer’s identity is unknown will thereby not fall under the definition of 
ostensive-inferential communication, even though ‘Your house is on fire!’ 
will be highly relevant no matter who said it. Then, what is meant by ‘make 
(more) manifest’ a set of (possible or actually made) assumptions I? One 
gathers that the speaker must be taken to try to make I (more) justified for the  
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listener. More simply, he must try to convince his hearer (or reinforce his 
hearer’s conviction) of the truth of what he intends to say. This, anyway, is 
the best one can make of this amazing definitional maze.  
    If this is what the authors wish to convey they are wrong. Besides missing 
non-assertive communicative speech acts, they also miss those assertive 
speech acts where the speaker does not try to convince at all and yet clearly 
communicates, with relevance and all. A speaker can say to his hearer ‘You 
are wrong’, knowing full well that so far from convincing his hearer he will 
make him more obstinate and even angry. And that may precisely be his 
intention. Generally, one can put forward an assertion and preface it with ‘I 
am not trying to convince you, but …’, without contradiction or paradox of 
any kind. What is going on in communication is something quite different, 
and much more to do with speech acts and the concomitant commitments. In 
rough outline one can say that a speaker who utters an assertion commits 
himself to the truth of that assertion to the extent that he is serious (and he 
thus incurs all the social and legal consequences that follow from this 
commitment). Since one may expect that serious people will not assume 
responsibilities too lightly, there is often some authority attached to asser- 
tions uttered, depending very much on who made the assertion, and when. 
For an analysis of the relevance factor in communication what counts is the 
commitment, not the authority.  
    Chapter 2, ‘Inference’, is devoted to the inferential element in comprehen- 
sion: the fact that tacit premises often have to be invoked in order to show the 
relevance of an utterance (often a reply). SW hold that such inferential chains 
are formal deductive procedures, and not some ‘loose form of inferencing’ 
(p.70, quoted from Brown & Yule 1983:34). This is perhaps so, though 
plausibility-based and default procedures cannot be ruled out. In any case, 
SW’s formalist position makes it all the more necessary, if not to set out 
criteria for the proper selection of tacit premises (which has proved too hard 
for everyone so far), anyway to specify the formalism, not only in terms of 
the computations performed, but also, as much as possible, in terms of actual 
cognitive functioning. From p.71 onwards, the chapter is devoted to the latter 
task. As regards the computations, an appeal is made, sensibly, to standard 
first order logic. This logic, however, as SW also quite rightly observe, is not 
ideally suited for natural language purposes: it is too poor, and it sometimes 
goes against the grain. So they propose to complement it a bit by adding 
degrees of certainty (and thus degrees of reliability of entailments) and some 
extra ‘rules’ based on what is ‘normally’ the case. And here SW make rather 
a mess of things.  
    The unit of computation, in SW’s conception, is not a formulaic rendering 
of a proposition but of an assumption, which can be held under varying 
degrees of strength or certainty. It is clearly the authors’ intention to present 
the logical apparatus in a cognitive setting. The build-up of this presentation 
is as follows. A distinction is made (p.71) between peripheral (modular) 
cognitive processes and central processes (much as in Fodor 1983). The logic  
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belongs in the latter, and it receives ‘conceptual representations’ more or less 
as raw material from the modular channels. ‘A conceptual representation is 
both a mental state and a brain state’ (p.72). In both qualities it can have non-
logical properties: ‘As a mental state it can have such non-logical properties 
as being happy or sad’ (note that the representation is said to be potentially 
happy or sad!). ‘As a brain state it can have such non-logical properties as 
being located in a certain brain at a certain time for a certain duration. Let us 
abstract away from all these non-logical properties, and call the remaining 
logical properties of a conceptual representation its logical form’ (ib.). One 
might now think that a logical form is both a partial mental state and a partial 
brain state. But no, ‘A logical form is a well-formed formula’, we read four 
lines down the page. And to one’s mounting amazement the text goes on:  
‘A logical form is propositional if it is semantically complete and therefore capable of 
being true or false, and non-propositional otherwise. A formal example of a non-propo-
sitional logical form is a predicate calculus formula containing a free variable: this may 
be syntactically well-formed without being fully propositional. A psychological exam-
ple of a non-propositional logical form is the sense of a sentence. Given that ‘she’ 
and ‘it’ in (2) below do not correspond to definite concepts, but merely mark an unoc-
cupied space where a concept might go, sentence (2) is neither true [n]or false:  
(2) She carried it in her hand.’  
The usual thing to say is, of course, that when in a formula all variables are 
bound then, given an interpretation, it expresses a proposition. Needless to 
say, SW are entitled to vary their terminology, but then one may expect a 
minimum of coherence. What, for example, do SW mean by ‘concept’? Their 
use of this term leads to considerable confusion, as will appear below when 
we come to p.85 of the book. Do they mean that a sentence like ‘The woman 
carried the bag in her hand’ corresponds to a ‘complete’ logical form, as 
opposed to the analogous sentence with pronouns? Yet, without an interpre- 
tation this isn’t true or false either. Or do they mean that definite terms, 
pronominal or lexical, need an interpretation for their sentence to have a 
truth-value? A marriage of logic and cognition is very much needed, in cog-
nitive science as well as in semantics and pragmatics. But it will have to be 
based on something better than faint echoes of elementary logic teaching 
mixed with loose psychology.  
    Then comes the next step: logical forms (propositional ones, one presumes) 
are mentally entertained under different propositional attitudes, including one 
of justified belief (p.73), in which case we have assumptions. The justified 
belief operator is assumed to be ‘prewired into the very architecture of the 
mind’ and need, therefore, not be explicitly expressed by means of a linguistic 
clement (p.74). Propositions under this operator are called ‘factual assump- 
tions’. No reasons are given for this prewiring assumption. Yet SW continue 
to speculate:  
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‘Conceivably, the attitude of desire might parallel the altitude of belief in having 
its own basic memory store or storage format. This would mean that desire, like 
belief, was prewired into the architecture of the human cognitive system.’ (ib.)  
No criteria are given by which one could decide whether or not an operator of 
propositional attitude is ‘basic’ in this sense, and one is left in the dark about 
the deeper grounds for SW’s assumption that, besides belief, ‘desire is the 
only other plausible case’ of basic storage (ib.).  
    In section 3 of this chapter SW allow for different degrees of confidence 
with regard to the ‘factual assumptions’ arrived at in the preceding pages. The 
degree of confidence is taken to be determined by the degree of confirmation, 
‘a term taken from a relatively undeveloped branch of logic’ (p.76). The 
degree of confirmation of an assumption is not represented by an absolute 
value on an index, but relatively, in comparison with other assumptions. 
Inferences are stronger to the extent that the premises are more justifiably 
believed, i.e., better confirmed.  
    Assumptions are also taken to be derivable from assumptions in virtue of 
fixed schemata. Thus (pp.82–83), one will assume that when an assumption 
of the form ‘if P then Q’ is encoded for transmission, the hearer will weakly 
infer ‘if not-P then not-Q’, and also ‘if Q, then Q because P’. Such formation 
of assumptions is considered ‘standard’. An example is:  
(8) a.    If Fido is pleased, then he wags his tail. 
 b.    If Fido is not pleased, then he does not wag his tail.  
 c.    If Fido wags his tail, then he does so because he is pleased.  
Given (8a), one ‘standardly’ weakly infers, according to SW, (8b) and (8c). 
The strength of this conclusion, however, depends solely on the example. A 
little experimenting soon shows that such weak inferences, though real for 
some cases, are absent in others. SW’s term ‘standard’ thus seems arbitrary 
as long as no argument is given why (8) is ‘standard’ but, e.g., (9a-f) are not:  
If Fido is pleased, the he wags his tail.  
(9)  a.    If Fido wags his tail, he is pleased. 
 b.    If Harry is asleep, he is alive.  
 c.    If Harry has eaten, he has eaten a mango.  
 d.    If Harry has a donkey, he beats it.  
 e.    If Harry is back, he has been away.  
 f.    If Harry has been away, he is back.  
One notes that in some of these cases the ‘weak inferences’ in question are 
absurd, while in other cases they are not weak but so solid as to be trivial. 
The interesting question is, of course, why some conditionals tend to invite 
such inferences while others don’t, and others again impose them as strong 
inferences. But this question is, typically, not mooted.  
     It appears that the notion of graded strength through confirmation serves  
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two purposes in the context of this book. First, the strength of ‘the set of 
assumptions’ which, according to the definition of ‘ostensive-inferential 
communication’, is to be made ‘manifest or more manifest to the audience’, is 
supposed to be inherited by the assumptions acquired by the hearer. In 
simpler terms, in SW’s view a successful communicator convinces his hearer 
of the truth of his own assumptions to precisely the degree of strength with 
which he himself entertains them. He transfers his own degree of certainty to 
his audience. And secondly, as one gathers from p.103, the notion of rele- 
vance is to be defined or approximated in terms of the quality of confirmation 
of the premises of some inferred assumption: ‘the relevance of new informa- 
tion to an individual is to be assessed in terms of the improvements it brings 
to his representation of the world.’  
    The sections 4 (‘Deductive rules and concepts’) and 5 (‘The deductive 
device’) do, in a way, the opposite of the sections 2 and 3. Whereas the two 
preceding sections aimed at enlarging the scope of cognitive logic with regard 
to standard logic by the addition of degrees of certainty and extra pragmatic 
rules, these sections want to show that cognitive logic is in some respects 
more restricted than standard logic. And again, the general point of view is 
both correct and well-known. The point here is that the standard notion of 
entailment is far too wide for the purpose of cognitive theory. Only some of 
the standard forms of entailment are psychologically natural, or, as SW say, 
spontaneous. Their problem, in these two sections, is ‘to restrict the class of 
[logical] implications that could in principle be computed by the human 
deductive device’ (p.103). This problem is, of course, both real and well-
known.  
    SW’s solution goes, in principle, as follows. They first introduce a new 
notion of ‘concept’ (p. 85):  
‘It seems reasonable to regard logical forms, and in particular the propositional 
forms of assumptions, as composed of smaller constituents to whose presence and 
structural arrangements the deductive rules are sensitive. These constituents we 
will call concepts. An assumption, then, is a structured set of concepts.’  
Note that, according to this definition, variables, for example, are concepts.     
Then, ‘each concept … appears as an address in memory, a heading under 
which various types of information can be stored and retrieved’ (p.86). This 
information ‘falls into three distinct types: logical, encyclopaedic and lexical’ 
(ib.). We thus have logical, encyclopaedic and lexical entries for concepts.  
Then:  
‘A logical entry consists of a set of deductive rules, each formally describing a set of 
input and output assumptions (!): that is, a set of premises and conclusions. Our first 
substantive claim is that the only deductive rules which can appear in the logical 
entry of a given concept are elimination rules for that concept. That is, they apply 
only to sets of premises in which there is a specified occurrence of that concept, and 
yield only conclusions from which that occurrence has been removed.’ (ib.)  
 134  
Occasionally, entries may be empty (p.92). In particular, ‘proper names and 
other concepts [can] be seen as having an empty logical entry’ (ib.). Apart 
from elimination rules, there are also introduction rules: ‘a rule whose output 
assumption contains every concept contained in its input assumption(s), and 
at least one further concept’ (p.96). These rules ‘are never used in the sponta- 
neous processing of information’ (p.97). The conclusion is that ‘non-trivial’ 
(the new name for ‘spontaneous’) logical implications are defined as follows 
(p.97):  
‘Non-trivial logical implication 
A set of assumptions {P} logically and non-trivially implies an assumption Q if 
and only if, when {P} is the set of initial theses in a derivation involving only 
elimination rules, Q belongs to the final theses.’  
    Among the many questions arising in connection with this definition, one 
is of immediate urgency: what are ‘final theses?’ For the answer we must go 
back to p.95:  
‘Deductions proceed as follows. A set of assumptions which will constitute the axioms, 
or initial theses, of the deduction are placed in the memory of the device. It reads 
each of these assumptions, accesses the logical entries of each of its constituent con-
cepts, applies any rule whose structural description is satisfied by that assumption, 
and writes the resulting assumption down in its memory as a derived thesis. Where 
a rule provides descriptions of two input assumptions, the device checks to see 
whether it has in memory an appropriate pair of assumptions; if so, it writes the 
output assumption down in its memory as a derived thesis. The process applies to 
all initial and derived theses until no further deduction is possible.’  
It thus appears that ‘the set of final theses’ consists of those ‘assumptions’ 
that allow for no further logical deduction. In the light of the foregoing this 
can only mean that such ‘assumptions’ consist exclusively of ‘concepts’ 
whose logical entries are empty.  
    It is not difficult to see that this is mere fumbling. The ‘definition’ of non-
trivial logical implication (or: cognitive entailment) is clearly to be taken to 
require, as a necessary and sufficient condition, that for all token occur- 
rences where P functions as the set of initial theses (in a derivation involving 
only elimination rules), Q is one of the ‘final theses’. This has the undesirable 
consequence that the ‘derived theses’ are not cognitively entailed by P, 
though they can be made part of some R cognitively entailing Q. But, more 
seriously, we do not know what the set of ‘final theses’ looks like, since we 
have no idea of the set of ‘concepts’ with empty logical entries (all we know 
is that ‘proper names and other concepts’ belong to this class).  
    Furthermore, SW’s ‘substantive claim’ that only elimination rules can figure 
in cognitive deductions is open to serious doubt. One would not wish to 
exclude, for example, the inference of ‘Someone escaped from prison’ from 
‘John escaped from prison’. This would be ‘John-elimination’ (cp. p. 90). But 
John, being a proper name, has an empty logic box and hence no rule to back  
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up this elimination. Nor would one wish to exclude, e.g., the inference of 
‘Someone really existing escaped from prison’ from ‘The murderer escaped 
from prison’. Elimination of the murderer (existential generalization) would 
give ‘Someone escaped from prison’, but this does not suffice to get actual 
existence of that someone. That entailment hinges on the fact that the 
predicate escape is extensional with respect to its subject (every constant 
subject term of escape must refer to an actually existing entity for the 
proposition with escape as its highest predicate to be true). The predicate 
imaginary, for example, is not extensional with respect to its subject: if I say 
truthfully ‘The murderer is imaginary’, then elimination of the murderer may 
give ‘Someone is imaginary’, but actual existence for this someone is not 
derivable. This means that entailments of actual existence, though no doubt 
natural and cognitively real, cannot be secured by means of an elimination 
rule.  
    Another stumbling block is the rule of and-introduction. SW maintain 
(pp.98–99) that this rule plays no role in natural inferencing. This is clearly 
counterintuitive. Suppose, in some context, Bennie must not be left alone in 
the house because he will immediately start making costly calls to his girl 
friend in Hawaii. You are responsible for the telephone bill and I am telling 
you that Bennie is at home. But you think your son Jimmy is at home as well, 
though nobody else is. Then I let on that Jimmy has left for a good long game 
of snooker with the boys. Would you not now realize that Bennie is at home 
and nobody else is there? SW themselves consider the following argument 
against their position that and-introduction does not occur in cognition. They 
let their imaginary opponent say (p.98): (a) modus ponens is a natural form 
of entailment, and (b) and-introduction occurs in modus ponens arguments of 
the following format:  
(10) (P ⋀ Q) ⊃ R  
  {P, Q}    P ⋀ Q (and-introduction)  
  —————————————— 
  ERGO:    R 
SW reply that the conclusion R can be reached without and-introduction as  
follows:  
(11) (P ⋀ Q) ⊃ R 
  P 
  —————————— 
  ERGO:    Q ⊃ R 
    Q 
  ————————————— 
    ERGO:    R  
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This is correct, but it must be noted that, if the deductive procedure is syntac-
tic, the equivalence is required of (P ⋀ Q) ⊃ R and P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R), whence 
modus ponens gives Q ⊃ R. In order to get this equivalence other than just 
elimination rules are required. Note that SW, apparently, do have in mind 
syntactic logical derivation: ‘The device we envisage is an automaton with a 
memory and the ability to read, write and erase logical forms …’ (pp.94–95). 
But if the derivation given in (11) is done semantically, it still remains true 
that (11) is a great deal more complex than (10). This is admitted by SW 
(p.99), which means that in their view cognition goes for the more complex 
procedures, surely a most unattractive position. For similar comments see 
Gazdar & Good (1982: 89–20).  
    Meanwhile the question of the criteria by which natural cognitive entail- 
ments can be singled out from the total set of logically valid entailments 
remains unsolved. Moreover, the logical apparatus that is postulated fails to 
satisfy even the mildest criteria that apply to a logical system. SW claim 
(p.103) that what they ‘have done is merely place an upper bound on the set 
of implications that could in principle be derived from a given set of assump- 
tions’, thereby referring, apparently, to their claim that the set of ‘final theses’ 
derivable from a finite set of premises is finite. But, as we have seen, the 
concept of ‘final thesis’ is as yet without any filling in its logical entry.  
    We are gradually getting closer, or so SW attempt to make us think, to the 
main target of the book, the characterization of the notion of relevance. The 
next station on this tortuous and longwinded path is the notion of contextual 
implication, introduced on p.107. I shall paraphrase the rather turgid text as 
faithfully as possible, stressing the relevant points.  
    A set of premises PR can, for pragmatic reasons, be split up into two 
mutually exclusive subsets P and C. C represents ‘old’ knowledge, i.e. (to the 
extent that the text is clear on this) either encyclopaedic knowledge or 
knowledge already processed (p.107). P represents ‘new’ knowledge or infor-
mation, i.e., ‘assumptions derived from perception or linguistic decoding 
(ib.). When such a split is made, P is said to be contextualized in C. A 
contextual implication is an entailment q from PR, such that neither P alone 
nor C alone entails q, and only natural cognitive deductive processes are 
involved. The entailment q as well as the information that was new until a 
moment ago have now been processed and pass into what will be C for any 
possible new P. The addition of q to the store of old information is called a 
contextual effect (pp.108–109).  
    No definition is given of the notion of ‘contextual effect’. The reader must 
make do with ‘the intuitive idea’ that ‘to modify and improve a context is to 
have some effect on that context’, whereby he is given to understand that the 
modification must be both related to old information and new (p.109). 
‘Intuitively’, again, ‘there should be two more types of contextual effect. On 
the one hand, new information may provide further evidence for, and there- 
fore strengthen, old assumptions; or it may provide evidence against, and 
perhaps lead to the abandonment of, old assumptions’ (ib.). The latter occurs  
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 (p. l14) ‘when there is a contradiction between new and old information’. In 
such cases the weaker of the two contradictory assumptions will be abandon- 
ed.2  
    As regards the ‘strenghtening’ effects, it is not made clear whether rela- 
tedness to old information is sufficient for the title of contextual effect, or 
whether there must also be actual strengthening, and certainly no weakening. 
In the latter interpretation, a conjuction of the form:  
(12)         Stocks in New York are plummeting, but oil prices are rising.  
should have a second conjunct without contextual effect even though it is 
related to the first conjunct. The criterion of relatedness is not elaborated, so 
that one must rely on one’s intuition in applying it. Or it should be that a new 
utterance is considered relevant when it, together with some body of back- 
ground knowledge, gives rise to a contextual implication. But even this 
charitable interpretation does not help much. For there will be few utterances 
that fail to give rise to some inference together with some background 
knowledge. But most of these SW will want to rule out as irrelevant, as indeed 
we would.  
    So what is needed is some further criterion of relevant background know- 
ledge. The same applies to cases of contradiction: often enough a new 
utterance will be logically incompatible with some bit of existing knowledge, 
but, of course, that will not suffice to make it relevant in any desired sense of 
the term. SW discuss the question of ‘context location’ at length (pp.132–
142), but, as we shall see, in vain. 
    The concept of relevance is then, finally, defined in chapter 3. The defini-  
tion proceeds in stages. On p.122 we read:  
‘Relevance  
An assumption is relevant in a context if and only if it has some contextual effect 
in that context.’  
SW then take up three pages of text to explain that this is a gradable notion, 
since the expression ‘some contextual effect’ allows for degrees. Unaccounta- 
bly, the definition is then extended with an extra condition to do with the 
principle of minimal effort. The result is found on p.125:  
‘Relevance 
Extent condition 1:  an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its 
contextual effects in this context are large. 
Extent condition 2:  an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the 
effort required to process it in this context is small.’  
Given this undeserving formal workmanship it will come as no surprise that 
it is easy to present examples with awkward consequences. We have already 
considered example (12): if strenghtening is a condition, the second conjunct  
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is not relevant, and if mere relatedness is a condition then we are left without 
any definition. Or take the well-known joke of the man eating in a restaurant 
and exclaiming:  
(13)     Waiter, there is a dead fly in my soup.  
Whereupon the waiter quips: 
(14)     I know, sir, it’s the heat that kills them.  
Clearly, the waiter’s reply is irrelevant here, but it is highly relevant in a very 
different situation where the ‘concern’ is about what killed the fly. SW’s 
analysis provides no way of making this distinction, since the union of 
whatever concern parameters make (14) relevant and whatever such parame- 
ters would make a really relevant reply relevant makes them both relevant. 
Clark (1982:127), in his critique of Sperber & Wilson (1982), makes the 
same point: ‘Surprisingly, the principle of relevance is mute on a crucial 
point about relevance itself: relevance with respect to what?’.  
    As regards the ‘extent condition 2’, which claims that smaller processing 
effort corresponds with greater relevance, the reader is referred to the tho- 
rough discussion of this point by Gazdar & Good (1982:92–98), who show 
that (a) so little is known about cognitive ‘processing cost’ that any claim in 
this direction is, in fact, empirically vacuous, and (b) any such relation of 
inverse proportionality, no matter the empirical content of the notion of 
‘processing cost’, will clash with natural intuitions and thus become implausi- 
ble.  
    It should be noted that SW insist (p.119) that they  
‘are not trying to define the ordinary English word ‘relevance’. ‘Relevance’ is a 
fuzzy term, used differently by different people, or by the same people at different 
times. It does not have a translation in every human language. There is no reason 
to think that a proper semantic analysis of the English word ‘relevance’ would 
also characterize a concept of scientific psychology. We do believe, though, that 
… there is an important psychological property—a property of mental processes—
which the ordinary notion of relevance roughly approximates, and which it is there-
fore appropriate to call relevance too, using the term now in a technical sense. 
What we are trying to do is … to define relevance as a useful theoretical concept.’  
Useful theoretical concepts, however, are useful, among other reasons, be- 
cause they fit into a deductively ordered set of theoretical statements or 
hypotheses yielding ‘theorems’ which, upon interpretation, reflect possible 
facts. If intuitions of relevance are not the factual basis required, what are? 
Normally speaking, one would expect that the theoretical analysis of the 
concept of relevance is meant as an explicitation of the intuitive notion. But if 
the intuitive notion is said not to be the object of investigation (though  
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perhaps vaguely related), then one is entitled to know what is the intended 
empirical basis for the intended ‘theoretical concept’ of relevance.  
    When discussing SW’s notions of ‘ostensive-inferential communication’ 
and of ‘assumption’, we concluded that the most probable interpretation of 
the hopelessly confused text was to attribute to SW the view that in communi- 
cation a speaker tries to convince his hearer of the truth of what he says. More 
specifically, communication is successful to the extent that the speaker 
transfers his own degree of certainty to his audience. We have criticised this 
‘rhetorical’ view of communication on the grounds that what counts in 
successful communication is the recognition on the part of the hearer of the 
kind and degree of commitment the speaker intends to take on, and not at all 
whether, in the case of assertions, the hearer allows himself to be actually 
convinced by the speaker. Such a view centers too much on assertions, and it is 
empirically inadequate. On p.103 SW go even further. There they claim that 
communication is helped, not just by a transfer of degree of conviction, but 
also by the actual truth of what is asserted: ‘the relevance of new information 
to an individual is to be assessed in terms of the improvements it brings to his 
representation of the world’. This claim is repeated on p.108 and on p.114. On 
p. l16 SW mix the rhetorical with the commitment view of communication:  
‘In verbal communication, the hearer is generally led to accept an assumption as 
true or probably true on the basis of a guarantee given by the speaker. Part of the 
hearer’s task is to find out which assumptions the speaker is guaranteeing as true. 
Our hypothesis is that the hearer is guided by the principle of relevance in carrying 
out this task. He expects the information the speaker intended to convey, when 
processed in the context the speaker expected it to be contextualized in, to be 
relevant: that is, to have substantial contextual effect, at a low processing cost. 
Thus, if the hearer assumes (91),  
(91)    The speaker intends to assert P 
and P turns out to be relevant in the expected way, assumption (91) is strengthen-
ed; moreover, if the hearer trusts the speaker to be truthful, assumption P is 
strengthened too. If P turns [out] to be relevant in the expected way only when 
assumption Q is added to the context, then assumption (92) is strengthened: 
(92)    The speaker intends the hearer to assume Q 
and again, if the hearer trusts the speaker, then assumption Q is strengthened.’  
The first thing that strikes the reader is, of course, the disarmingly candid 
statement that strengthening is a result of relevance, and not the other way 
around, as the definitions want it to be. But the point here is that this 
quotation is confused in that it makes the degree to which the hearer trusts the 
speaker play a systematic role. It is trivially true that a speaker’s convincing 
power covaries with his authority and with the hearer’s pre-existing know- 
ledge. It is true that relevance guides interpretation. It is likewise true that the 
reconstruction of a relevant context or inference itself helps determining 
whether an interpretation is correct: a fitting hypothesis may be circular, it 
confirms itself by its fit. But the trustworthiness of the speaker does not, in 
general, play a role in spotting the correct interpretation of an utterance. The 
truth or falsity of P in SW’s (91) is generally irrelevant, and it matters not a  
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whit whether P is strengthened or not. What may matter, for a correct 
interpretation, is whether SW’s (92) is true, but then, whether or not Q is 
‘strenghtened’ is nothing to do with the process of comprehension. Further- 
more, (92) fails as a general condition. The general condition is more like ‘the 
truth of (91) depends on the assumption that the speaker assumes Q’. But SW 
throw everything into one bag.  
    What effects this can have is illustrated by an example that they themselves 
provide. Let us look again at the little episode of the flag-seller and the 
passer-by, described in (6) and (7) above (pp.121–122 of the book). A crucial 
premise for the conclusion is (7e): ‘someone who has no need of the services 
of a charity cannot be expected to subscribe to that charity’. Hopefully, this is 
not part of the background knowledge of anyone interpreting the passer-by’s 
refusal to contribute. As SW themselves say (p.121), ‘the hearer must be able 
to supply’ the premises, and in this case this means that he must hypothesize, 
or if you like ‘assume’, that this is a premise in the passer-by’s mind. On this 
hypothesis the passer-by’s utterance makes some sense. But now one wonders 
if (7e) should be considered ‘old’ or ‘new’ information. It can hardly be old, 
for the hearer that is, since the flag-selling hearer is not likely to sell flags if 
he thinks (7e) is true. If it is new, one wonders how it can be regarded as an 
‘improvement … to his representations of the world’ (p.103). Clearly, (7e) 
itself plays no part in the hearer’s world representation, but the fact that the 
speaker apparently assumes (7e) is important for a correct interpretation of 
the speaker’s refusal to contribute. SW fail to make this distinction and thus 
get entangled in absurdities.  
    For example, if (7e) is relevant in SW’s sense (or at least in terms of their 
definitions to the extent that these are interpretable), it must not be ‘eliminat-
ed’ in favour of the hearer's own conviction to the contrary. Yet, his well-
established conviction that charities are worth contributing to for other than 
purely egotistical reasons will no doubt prevail. Despite this, he interprets the 
passer-by’s reply correctly. In fact, his correct interpretation (always assum-
ing that the interpretation as sketched by SW is the one that took place) 
depends on the ‘assumption’ (7e) in so far as he must ‘assume’ that the 
speaker ‘assumes’ (7e). SW cross metaborders unawares: they fail to distin- 
guish, for a proposition p, between taking p as true, and taking p as believed 
to be true by an interlocutor. Yet p has a very different status in one case and 
in the other.  
    A problem that has been touched upon but not dealt with is that of the 
selection of the proper context or set of background assumptions. Wilks 
(1986) points out that the answer provided by SW in their 1982 paper makes 
the definition of relevance circular. In 1982 SW stated that ‘the search for the 
interpretation on which an utterance will be most relevant involves a search 
for the context which will make this interpretation possible. In other words, 
determination of the context is not a prerequisite to the comprehension 
process, but a part of it’ (p.76). Wilks replies (1986:273) that this makes 
nonsense of the condition, quoted above (‘extent condition 2’): ‘an assump- 
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tion is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to process it 
in this context is small’. For if the determination of the context C for an 
assumption A is part of the processing of A, then the relevance of A may 
involve a search for a suitable C, so that A is relevant, but it makes no sense 
to speak of the relevance of A in C. The objection seems valid, and one 
would have expected SW to do something about this point (e.g. by dropping 
‘extent condition 2’, which would have been a wise move anyway in view of 
Gazdar & Good’s critique mentioned above): Wilks’s point, though published 
as late as 1986, has been known to the authors since 1982.  
    Yet, as we have seen, the offending condition has not been removed or 
remedied in the 1986 version under review, and, after some searching in the 
verbose text, one discovers that the circularity has not been removed either. 
The selection of the proper context, in which some ‘assumption’ to be 
processed is relevant, is still part of the processing of that assumption, as it 
was in 1982. On pp.137–138 we read:  
‘We assume that a crucial step in the processing of new information, and in 
particular of verbally communicated information, is to combine it with an ade-
quately selected set of background assumptions—which then constitutes the 
context—in the memory of the deductive device.’  
One would now, naturally, wish to be instructed as to the meaning of the 
expression ‘adequately selected’. And, after a great deal of dodging, SW 
finally inform us (p.141): ‘Our answer is that the selection of a particular 
context is determined by the search for relevance’. So nothing has changed. 
The problem has only been tucked away in a larger amount of text. The 
problem is, as it was before, mainly located in the search for a suitable 
context, or, as we called it at the outset, ‘concern’. And there is nothing in the 
book under review that has brought this problem nearer to a solution.  
    There is thus hardly any justification for the regular use of the term 
‘relevance theory’, from p.130 onwards. What SW have offered comes no- 
where near the status of a theory. The use of this term is an improper 
appropriation of prestige.  
    The last chapter (Aspects of verbal communication) is mainly a loose 
collection of thoughts on the nature of communication and its relation with 
language, on implicatures, and on literary and stylistic aspects of communi- 
cation. (Presuppositions, as we said earlier, are treated under ‘style’). There is 
little of interest to be found in these pages, and I shall refrain from comment 
on all issues but one: at the beginning of the chapter SW present some, largely 
philosophical, ideas about the relation between language and communica-
tion. On p.172 we read: ‘Languages are indispensable not for communica-
tion, but for information processing; this is their essential function’. One 
would have thought that information processing is anyhow indispensable for 
any kind of communication, so that, if language is necessary for information 
processing, it is likewise for communication, necessity being a transitive  
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relation. On p.174 SW make their meaning a little clearer: ‘Language is not a 
necessary medium for communication: non-coded communication exists’ 
(italics mine). A communicating device must have ‘an internal language’, and 
therefore, SW conclude, the essential function of language is not its use in 
verbal communication but to make information processing possible. Thus, on 
p.173:  
‘Our point is precisely that the property of being a grammar-governed represen-
tational system and the property of being used for communication are not sys-
tematically linked. They are found together in the odd case of human natural lan-
guages, just as the property of being an olfactory organ and the property of being a 
prehensile organ, though not systematically linked in nature, happen to be found 
together in the odd case of the elephant’s trunk.’  
One hears echoes here of Chomsky’s ramblings, in the late ’60s and the early 
’70s, on the same subject. There is a simple confusion, here, between overt 
languages, with their grammars and their lexicons, as they exist in the world, 
on the one hand, and internal computional and representational systems on 
the other. SW prefer to call such internal computational systems likewise 
‘languages’, like computer ‘languages’. But nothing shows that this is not a 
metaphor. In any case, it is reasonable to surmise that actual, overt languages 
are highly functional for human communication: in what way other than by 
the use of grammar-governed and lexically elaborated representational sys- 
tems would communication be possible about the extraordinarily wide range 
of topics that humans can and do communicate about? In the internal systems 
we find a coupling of representational and computational functions. In the 
actual languages of the world we find a coupling of representational and 
communicative functions. In neither case is the coupling ‘odd’. On the 
contrary, it is not difficult to argue that in both cases the couplings are highly 
functional.  
    It would be a pity not to mention one last gem, found on pp.205–206. Here 
SW discuss the sentence ‘John invited Lucy’, and assign it the ‘logical form’:  





Not surprisingly, SW fail to enlighten their readers on the logic in terms of 
which (15) can be used for deductions.  
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NOTES  
1. It is tempting to think that this is an implicit admission of the failure of Wilson’s 
attempt (1975) at giving a pragmatic account of presupposition. 
2. This is different from all or most existing theories of acceptable discourse construc-
tion, where contradiction, if spotted, leads to unacceptability of the discourse. (See, 
e.g., Van der Sandt 1982; in press).  
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